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Abstract 
We describe a concept to employ Trusted Computing 
technology to secure Conditional Access Systems 
(CAS) for DVB. Central is the embedding of a trusted 
platform module (TPM) into the set-top-box or 
residential home gateway. Various deployment 
scenarios exhibit possibilities of charging co-operation 
with mobile network operators (MNO), or other 
payment providers. 
Keywords 
Trusted computing, conditional access system, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Delivery of digital content to customers is an 
emerging market with high potential revenues. For 
various business cases protection of the consumption 
good as a base for charging processes is required. 
This invention report addresses the design of a 
trusted set-top box which can be reconfigured for 
various content protection schemes and payment 
methods. This reconfiguration is done in a trustworthy 
way. Some implementation variations are presented 
and discussed.  
Digital Video Broadcast (DVB) as the widest spread 
standard for digital content delivery implements a 
protection for the digital data. DVB exists in three 
branches specialized for different broadcasting 
techniques und formats as satellite (DVB-S), 
terrestrial (DVB-T), and mobile environment (DVB-H). 
All branches are equal in its processing of the signal 
provided. The signal is encrypted by the Common-
Scrambling-Algorithm (CSA) which needs a 8 byte 
seed for initialization (only 6 bytes are used), the so 
called Code Word (CW). This Code Word is provided 
by a second algorithm the Conditional-Access-System 
(CAS). There are many vendors offering CAS 
Modules for the provider of the content like 
Cryptoworks or NDS. 
CSA was kept as a secret over a couple of years, but 
was revealed some time ago [1].  Until now CSA is 
not broken. Microsoft with its DRM solution is a 
second example for existing systems protecting digital 
content. 
 
Payment solutions are the aim for the smart card – 
set-top box combination. This market is dominated by 
smart card subscriptions. The customer registers the 
card after purchase at the provider and is able to 
descramble the digital stream for a certain time. On 
this basis, pay per view schemes are in use clearing 
the program for a certain time, e.g. for one movie. The 
accounting is for instance solved by using value 
added telephone services. A second way of charging 
for DVB content is using mobile payment solutions. 
One (German) peculiarity is the use of debit or credit 
cards in combination with a feedback channel of the 
set-top box [2]. 
In the established DVB scheme, the Conditional 
Access System (CAS) is assigned to perform this 
essential role of bridging between the encrypted, 
digital data stream and a smart card providing the 
required keys.  Due to various different CAS systems 
the customer needs different cards often with different 
Conditional Access Modules (CAM).  We propose a 
concept based on trusted computing, to improve on 
this state of affairs. 
CONCEPTS AND DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS 
TC as it is currently being standardized in the PC and 
mobile domain offers a highly flexible and reliable 
security infrastructure enabling various kinds of 
authentication, authorization, and audit schemes. A 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) acts as a hardware 
anchor and provides a unique identity of the particular 
device. This anchor provides cryptographic abilities 
for creation, storage, and usage of asymmetric key 
pairs. On top of this TPM abilities TC offers a metric to 
measure the system state and to report this 
measurement to a third entity. A further main ability is 
to bind certain data cryptographically to the particular 
platform and its state. An overview on Trusted 
Computing functionality can be found in the appendix. 
Based on these three basic features a virtualization of 
the CAS is feasible. Implementing in this way a 
trusted set-top box in the context of DVB can be done 
in many variations. An elementary implementation 
stores the functionality of the CAM and of the smart 
card as software protected by means of the TPM. If 
the user requests an encrypted channel, the set top 
box uses the CAM/smart card software to create the 
respective code words required by the CAS.  
Online CAS 
A system which emulates the actual CAS systems in 
software has to enforce that keys used to generate 
the CWs required by the CAS are kept secret. The 
security of the proposed system has to be guaranteed 
even if the algorithm is published. Beide this technical 
requirement online verification of the access rights as 
a second requirement is the premise for dynamically 
granted content access. This leads to an 
authentication scheme where the CAS asks for 
permission before the CWs are created. Therefore a 
connection is established by a communication module 
granting access to a network. 
A protocol solving this problem has to perform the 
following steps. In preparation an appropriate roll out 
of the set-top boxes has to happen. During the roll-out 
a take ownership by the provider is required. A 
network operator can be used instead of the provider 
assigning user identities and, optionally, performing 
charging processes. The proposed scenario consists 
of four parties: customer, provider, charging provider, 
and network operator as depicted in Figure 1. The 
network operator issues the set-top boxes to the 
customers in the same way as they offer mobile 
devices. The bonding between customer and device 
is based e.g. on a SIM-card. An online take ownership 
is as well possible as described in the subsequent 
section.  
 
 
 
 
The network operator establishes his trust in the 
device by a network operator issued credential which 
is produced by the box on request. Based on this 
underlying trust relation the (M)NO can assure the 
identity of the set-top box to a supplier. This second 
(transitive) relation [3] is based on a second credential 
issued either by the network operator or the trusted 
set-top box. In either case the network operator in his 
role as an identity provider (ID) signs this credential 
which therefore is stored in the trusted set-top box. If 
a customer decides to consume a certain service it 
offers this credential to the vendor (V), for instance 
the content provider. V uses this credential to verify 
the identity against ID. V then delivers the content and 
requests charging by ID. In this scenario the user is 
unknown to V as the credential is only validated by ID. 
ID does not need to reveal the identity to V. AIKs from 
the context of the trusted computing standard can be 
used as such credentials identifying a certain user. 
Delivery in this context means that V transfers a 
secret into the trusted set-top box and adds this 
secret to the list of accepted credentials as this is 
known by the actual process of conventional CASs. 
This secret is sealed in the set-top box by using the 
sealing functionality of the TPM. This means the 
issued secret can only be used in the same 
trustworthy state of the box. The root of trust in this 
case is the ability of attestation of the integrity to a 
third party e.g. V or ID. 
In an online CAS a tight interweaving between 
content access control and payment scenarios is 
possible. This is discussed in the following section. 
Online take ownership / online registration 
The aim of an online take ownership procedure is to 
establish a user identifying credential into a trusted 
set-top box without the need to issue the box over a 
special infrastructure provided by ID. The customer 
should be able to buy such a box everywhere she 
wants. During production every box gets an identifier 
in form of the unique platform certificate. Based on 
this initial credential a protocol can be performed to 
establish a user related certificate. This user 
certificate is used to identify the user at V. The used 
protocol establishing this user credential depends if 
there is a direct or indirect communication between V 
and ID. 
The user certificate can be created after the take 
ownership process of a trusted platform which binds a 
TPM to a certain user using a 160 bit authentication 
value (TPM owner authorization). AIKs are available 
after the take ownership to be used as credentials 
testifying the identity of a user. An AIK can only be 
created offering a valid TPM owner authorization and 
is a private/public key pair. The private portion is 
shielded inside the TPM. After this, a privacy CA 
issues a certificate to assert the relation between AIK 
and TPM. See the Appendix. For this initial AIK and 
certificate creation process an online connection to a 
privacy CA is required. The pertinent protocol has to 
protect the origin of the key so that it is impossible to 
fake a TPM. 
Figure 1. Online CAS scenario
In the case of a direct communication the system is 
equipped with a communication device enabling the 
direct contact to the privacy CA. In this case the 
mentioned protocols can be used without any 
restrictions. If the system is not equipped with such a 
communication device at least a short range 
communication is required enabling a take ownership 
over a secondary communication device (SD) like a 
cell phone. The SD forwards the communication in 
the respective direction. 
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It is important to mention that there has to be a trust 
relation between the privacy CA and the content 
providers. In this use case AIKs are used as tickets 
which enable accounting. Therefore it could be 
possible that the privacy CA should be able to reveal 
the identity of a certain AIK, e.g. in case of suspected 
fraud. 
After the take ownership an online registration at the 
respective provider is required to sign up to a certain 
service. In this process two goals have to be 
achieved. First, the identity of the mobile device (and 
therefore the identity of the user) has to be registered 
at the service provider. By issuing the AIK and the 
belonging certificate the identity can be proved and by 
performing a handshake protocol between service 
provider and mobile device the origin is testified. The 
second aim is to negotiate about the details of the 
subscription. One part of these details is the payment 
information. The service provider transmits a data 
structure which describes the available charging 
models and services. The user selects from this offer, 
signs the selection with the private portion of the AIK 
and transmits this to the service provider. 
A proof of authenticity of the service provider is also 
required. Hence it is necessary to sign messages 
issued by the service provider. A verification of the 
authenticity can be achieved using known PKI 
structures or built-in root certificates. Alternatively, the 
MNO can vouch for the authenticity of a certain 
service provider replacing conventional PKI systems. 
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as Figure 3. AIK authentication for content access.ure 3 shows a basic scheme using AIKs as 
thentication tokens. The protocol is divided in two 
ases. Phase 1 is concerned wit the AIK creation 
d certification, phase 2 is the usage of this token. 
e set-top box transmits in 1) certain credentials of 
 platform and the public portion of the AIK to the 
A which verifies the offered credentials and then 
ransmits (2) an certificate stating that this AIK 
longs to a an accepted platform.  If the MNO works 
PCA the AIK can later be used as a payment 
dential as the MNO can reveal the identity of the 
rs based on the certificate. This feature is used in 
ase 2 where the set-top box offers the AIK and the 
responding certificate to a service provider (3). Figure 2. Offline take ownership.
is service provider performs an attestation of the 
x in this step and then request from the CA the 
idity of the offered certificate (4,5). 4 and 5 can be 
rformed e.g. using OCSP responder known from 
I infrastructures. Step 6 returns the acceptance 
rmation of the service provider (this answer should 
 signed by him). To validate the signature on side 
the set-top box an appropriate certificate must be 
ilable in the device. It can be necessary to request 
 root certificate from a trustworthy third party. After 
 the set-top box has been successfully registered 
 certain service provider.  
yment Scenarios 
sted computing offers the possibility for client-side 
yment systems. The main idea is that the set-top 
x handles charging in equivalent to prepaid or pay-
you-go scenarios. The box meters the 
sumption of the digital content. Either an internal 
posit is decremented or the consumption data is 
red and after a certain time read by V and charged. 
e second alternative requires a trusted time source 
the device to enable time stamps for the recorded 
tering data. This time source can be implemented 
an online time authority which offers a time-
stamping service. Another option is an internal time 
source based on the trusted platform. This shall be 
discussed elsewhere. A third usage scenario is the 
well known distribution of keys which are 
descrambling a channel for a certain time. 
The first alternative requires a central authority to 
increment the internal deposit. Therefore it is required 
to transmit the increment value to the respective box. 
The increment value is signed by the concerned 
charging service and encrypted by the public portion 
of the AIK. These two steps are ensuring that this 
packet is bound to one device. Preventing a replay 
attack requires to include (i) to perform an attestation 
of the particular device by the charging service 
testifying the integrity of the device and (ii) to integrate 
a Nonce issued by the charging service to prevent 
that the packet is used twice. The box stores these 
Nonces and rejects replayed packets. A basic 
protocol works as follows. In step (1) the box requests 
for an increment of the internal deposit, offering the 
AIK and a corresponding certificate. Step (2) performs 
an attestation and within this step a handshake 
testifying the correlation of the AIK and its certificate. 
At some point the in these first two steps the charging 
provider has to decide if he accepts this AIK based on 
a contractual relation to the user or its charging 
provider and PCA. After step 2 the charging provider 
has to decide which amount is transferred to the box. 
This can be done based on a pre-paid scenario, a 
pay-as-you-go scheme, or other contractual scenarios 
like charging the telephone bill of the user if the PCA 
or the charging provider is operated by the MNO. 
Storing the consumption in the device is the second 
alternative. Here it is possible to offer the user the 
possibility first to consume the content and afterwards 
to pay for it as it is known from e.g. cellular phones. 
The stored consumption data are transferred to the 
charging provider either by a push system where the 
box is in charge for transferring the data to the 
provider or by a pull system where the provider 
requests the data from every box. The most 
significant difference between these two schemes is 
the signaling of the box as the pull solution requires a 
built in communication device like a GSM module. 
Building on a push solution another device like a 
mobile phone can be utilized to transfer the data to 
the charging provider. Important to note in the second 
case is that the logged data require a special 
protection against forgery. Therefore each 
consumption log record needs to be time stamped by 
a trustworthy time source. After the transfer of the 
consumption log the charging provider charges the 
consumer belonging to the system. This relation 
between consumption data and user is expressed by 
signing the data with the respective AIK which was 
first registered at the charging provider (see last 
section). As a privacy protection after the signing the 
data can be encrypted by a public key belonging to 
the charging provider. By this an MNO or any third 
party listening to the data stream cannot create usage 
profiles of the customers. 
A third alternative is based on usage credentials 
which are basically descrambling keys inserted e.g. in 
the conventional CAS implemented in DVB and 
enhanced by a constraint of e.g. its usage period. 
Other constraints are also possible. Examples are 
maximum boundaries of daily usage, or time of 
usage. Issuing such a restricted key to a system 
requires (i) an attestation of the system before the key 
is transmitted to proof the integrity of the system, (ii) a 
PKI structure to enable the system to verify the origin 
of the data, and (iii) a charging infrastructure which 
maintains the keys. Based on the CAS system it can 
be necessary to store the key in a sealed environment 
as it is offered by the TPM sealing functions. A variant 
of this kind of content protection is exhibited in [4] 
ADVANCED FUNCTIONALITIES AND BENEFITS 
A trusted set-top box enables the creation of a 
universal decoder for broad range of different 
scrambling systems without the need for the user to 
physically change the smart card. The virtualization of 
the CAS hardware is also interesting for reducing the 
costs of a single set top box. This can sensibly be 
combined with either a long range communication 
module, e.g. GSM or UMTS, or a near range 
communication module like Bluetooth or NFC. This 
enhancement enables complex scenarios with 
respect to accounting and charging, some of which 
are presented in the following list. 
 As mentioned, the communication between 
the trusted set-top box can be performed by 
an integrated long range communication 
device or a near range device. Using 
GSM/UMTS in a box enables the cooperation 
between a mobile network operator who can 
offer accounting, charging, and maintenance 
for the customers and box vendor/DVB 
provider. The MNO is also able to offer a well 
tested authentication system in form of the 
SIM-card known in the mobile domain. Based 
on this primary identifier other authentication 
schemes using the TPM are possible as they 
are introduced in [5]. 
 Online payment using e.g. credit cards in the 
set-top box is one of the most important 
possibilities which are enabled by trusted set 
top boxes. 
 Implementing an online CAS Module which 
replaces the CAS-Smartcard complex can 
eliminate the possibility of using fake smart 
cards as the box can control the access rights 
by an access control list at the side of the 
provider. TC provides in this scenario the 
authenticity and identity of the box and the 
attestation of its integrity (by the TC methods 
of remote, or direct anonymous attestation). 
With these basic assumptions it is possible to 
implement a trustworthy client side CAS. 
 As the set-top box can be considered as 
trustworthy, such a box enables easy-to-use 
payment schemes which have the potential to 
replace existing Pay-per-View schemes. By 
executing charging on the client side, price 
schedules can depend on the consumed 
service or content which can be metered by 
the trustworthy box. It would as well be 
possible to recognize debit and credit cards or 
to prepay various contents. 
 Online Algorithm updates for video decryption 
are an extension of the variants above, which 
enables on demand reconfiguration for 
unknown decryption schemes or the 
exchange of existing ones. The vendor or 
broadcaster can issue in a standardized 
configuration file the new algorithm which is to 
be used in the box to decrypt the incoming 
video stream. This also enables over the air 
enhancements and updates of the trusted set 
top box e.g. faster implementations. 
Near range communication devices like Bluetooth 
require SDs like mobile phone as communication 
intermediaries to the broadcaster. As it may be 
cheaper than a dedicated GSM module in each set-
top box this could be the better choice. This solution 
requires charging in the set-top box as described 
above. Charging and updates are performed by using 
SD. After this step the set-top box works autonomous. 
Algorithm updates 
As stated in the introduction the scrambling of the 
digital content relies on the security of the CSA. This 
algorithm has to fulfill two requirements. The first is to 
provide a secure scrambling of the data. The second 
is the real-time environment. The digital stream has to 
be descrambled in the moment it arrives. This leads 
to an algorithm the strength of which is not as high as 
possible and the need to replace the algorithm can be 
foreseen [5, 6], entailing a complete change of the 
installed infrastructure on side of the customers as 
well – a very costly and inconvenient effort. 
From the viewpoint of customer satisfaction it is 
advantageous if it is possible to update a certain 
device to new required standards and protocols. As 
introduced in the online CAS section, it is possible to 
implement the complete CAS as a software module 
protected by the underlying TC architecture. 
Depending on the implementation modules of the 
DVB system can be updated by a software protocol. 
The update process can be started by the system 
based on an explicit user request. First, the device 
transmits a nonce and a device description data block 
(DDDB) to the update service which is signed by the 
AIK. Depending on the DDDB the update service 
creates a data block containing the new firmware of 
the device and signs it with the signing key of the 
update service. This data is then encrypted with the 
AIK and send to the device. The device then decrypts 
and checks the received data and updates the 
system. If reprogrammable hardware such like FPGAs 
the update results in a reprogramming of the 
hardware. It is important to consider reliable checks of 
the content of such hardware and hardware based 
methods with are protecting the content of such 
hardware against fraud. 
The presented concept enables a full modular system 
where it is possible to replace every part of the 
descrambling in a trustworthy way. Using for instance 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) technology 
in combination with Trusted Computing enables the 
replacement of every part of the existing DVB 
architecture. This has the advantage that it is possible 
to implement algorithms in hardware gaining a speed-
up compared with software based implementations. 
FPGAs are programmed (reconfigured) before they 
can perform the desired task. Trustworthy 
implementations have to verify the content of the 
FPGA before data are transmitted between FPGA 
and the CAM. 
Multi-CAS management 
New accounting and charging systems can be 
established using the TPM and the trusted 
environment. Here the sealing functionality is 
highlighted, as a replacement (or new specification) 
for the CAS. One box can house various CAS 
concurrently without any extra hardware costs. 
Charging can be transferred into the Box by adding 
specialized software and appropriate hardware. The 
trustworthy state of both can be proved in the trusted 
boot process and attested to an external verifier by 
remote or anonymous attestation. The box can handle 
the charging process and control the access to the 
charged commodity. By this, new payment 
infrastructures can be established, e.g., for home 
shopping. 
Mobile co-operation 
The presented concepts offer a high degree of co-
operation of DVB service providers with mobile 
networks and their MNOs. This co-operation brings 
major benefits, though the technology DVB is not 
common in the mobile domain. The MNO can provide 
primary services to DVB operaters or broadcaster:  
• Management of subscribers 
• Potential merging of the subscriber bases 
• Charging 
• Dynamical control of security features 
• Enhanced CAS security 
• Marketing co-operation 
Furthermore the concept can complement current or 
development mobile content protection like OMA. In 
effect it enables MNOs to enter a mobile video 
broadcasting partial market. The underlying concept 
is not limited to DVB. It can enhance or substitute 
existing CAS systems for streaming multimedia 
applications. It is also possible to combine this with a 
bonding of the set-top box to a special mobile phone 
or network operator. A network operator can offer set-
top boxes as part of their customer retention. 
Client-side watermarking 
As an extension the box can apply certain digital 
rights management (DRM) functionalities upon the 
digital content. These restrictions can be applied by 
the box dependent on the contract between the 
partners. These restrictions can for example regulate 
the count of allowed copies. Depending on the rights 
purchased by the user different usages of the content 
(multiple viewing, multiple private copies, quality 
discrimination, commercial-free versions, etc) can be 
permitted by application of DRM techniques. As every 
customer can buy different rights for one digital asset 
this restriction have to be added on customer side. It 
could also be intended, as an alternative to ‘hard’ 
DRM, to tag a digital asset and by this to suppress the 
distribution. This leads to the need to include a 
marking identifying the individual customer, while still 
preserving his/her privacy. This service can be a 
major reason to apply watermarking at client-side. 
This can be implemented with ease within the trusted 
set-top-box based on our concept. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that turning set-top boxes into trusted 
platforms according to TCG specifications offers 
attractive novel possibilities for DVB content 
distribution, CAS operation, and payment. 
Prerequisites for implementation seem rather low as 
todays set-top boxes are already full-fledged PCs and 
TC will be ubiquitous in the near future. 
In a more evolved scenario the TPM could be an 
integral element of the code word scheme replacing 
the smartcard. 
APPENDIX 
Trusted Computing Essentials 
Trusted Computing uses a hardware anchor as a root 
of trust and is now entering the mobile domain with 
the aim to provide a standardised security 
infrastructure. Trust as defined by the Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) means that an entity always 
behaves in the expected manner for the intended 
purpose. The trust anchor, called Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM), offers various functions related to 
security. Each TPM is bound to a certain environment 
and together they form a trusted platform (TP) from 
which the TPM cannot be removed. Through the TPM 
the TP gains a cryptographic engine and a protected 
storage. Each physical instantiation of a TPM has a 
unique identity by an Endorsement Key (EK) which is 
created at manufacture time. This key is used as a 
base for secure transactions as the Endorsement Key 
Credential (EKC) asserts that the holder of the private 
portion of the EK is a TPM conforming to the TCG 
specification. The EKC is issued as well at production  
time and the private part of the key pair does not 
leave the TPM. There are other credentials specified 
by the TCG which are stating the conformance of the 
TPM and the platform for instance the so called  
platform credential. Before a TPM can be used a take 
ownership procedure must be performed in which the 
usage of the TPM is bound to a certain user. The 
following technical details are taken from [7].  
The TPM is equipped with a physical random number 
generator, and a key generation component which 
creates RSA key pairs. The key generator is designed 
as a protected capability, and the created private keys 
are kept in a shielded capability (a protected storage 
space inside the TPM). The shielded capabilities 
protect internal data structures by controlling their 
use. Three of them are essential for applications. 
First, key creation and management, second the 
ability to create a trust measurement which can be 
used to assert a certain state toward a, remote party, 
and finally sealing methods to protect arbitrary data 
by binding it (in TCG nomenclature) to TP states and 
TPM keys.   
For the TPM to issue an assertion about the system 
state, two attestation protocols are available. As the 
uniqueness of every TPM leads to privacy concerns, 
they provide pseudonymity, resp., anonymity. Both 
protocols rest on Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) 
which are placeholders for the EK. An AIK is a 1024 
bit RSA key whose private portion is sealed inside the 
TPM. The simpler protocol Remote Attestation (RA) 
offers pseudonymity employing a trusted third party, 
the Privacy CA (PCA), which issues a credential 
stating that the respective AIK is generated by a 
sound TPM within a valid platform. The system state 
is measured by a reporting process with the TPM as 
central reporting authority receiving measurement 
values and calculating a unique representation of the 
state using hash values. For this, the TPM has 
several Platform Configuration Registers (PCR). 
Beginning with the system boot each component 
reports a measurement value, e.g., a hash value over 
the BIOS, to the TPM and stores it in a log file. During 
RA the communication partner acting as verifier 
receives this log file and the corresponding PCR 
value. The verifier can then decide if the device is in a 
configuration which is trustworthy from his 
perspective. Apart from RA, the TCG has defined 
Direct Anonymous Attestation. This involved protocol 
is based on a zero knowledge proof but due to certain 
constraints of the hardware it is not implemented in 
current TPMs. 
AIKs are crucial for applications since they can not 
only be used, according to TCG standards, to attest 
the  origin and authenticity of a trust measurement,  
but also to authenticate other keys generated by the 
TPM. Before an AIK can testify the authenticity of any 
data, a PCA has to issue a credential for it. This 
credential together with the AIK can therefore be used 
as an identity for this platform. The protocol for 
issuing this credential consists in three basic steps.  
First, the TPM generates an RSA key pair by 
performing the TPM_MakeIdentity command. The 
resulting public key together with certain credentials  
identifying the platform is then transferred to the PCA. 
Second, the PCA verifies the correctness of the 
produced credentials and the AIK signature. If they 
are valid the PCA creates the AIK credential which 
contains an identity label, the AIK public key, and 
information about the TPM and the platform. A special 
structure containing the AIK credential is created 
which is used in step three to activate the AIK by 
executing the TPM_ActivateIdentity command. So 
far, the TCG-specified protocol is not completely 
secure, since between steps two and three, some 
kind of handshake between PCA and platform is 
missing. The existing protocol could  sensibly be 
enhanced by a challenge/response part to verify the 
link between the credentials offered in step one and 
used in step two, and the issuing TPM. The remote 
attestation process is shown in Figure 4. 
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blob. In consequence this data blob is only accessible 
if the platform is in the namely state which is 
associated with the respective PCR value. 
A mobile version of the TPM is currently being defined 
by the TCG's Mobile Phone Working Group [8]. This 
Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) differs significantly 
from the TPM of the PC world and is in fact more 
powerful in some respects. In particular, it contains a 
built-in verifier for attestation requests, substituting 
partly for an external PCA. Both TPM and MTM are a 
basis for application architectures. Trusted Computing 
affects the world of networked PCs but also heavily 
impacts the mobile industry. 
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